History: Bad Nenndorf
The scandal at Bad Nenndorf
Despite the crucial role which Bad Nenndorf performed in the early Cold War, Stephens struggled to run the camp effectively. The camp was undermined by funding reductions and insufficient resources. Due to massive post-war demobilisation, it was staffed by under-trained and under-experienced interrogators. Seven hundred staff had been stationed at Bad Nenndorf's in 1945, but by 1946 staff numbers had been slashed to approximately 330. According to later testimony, some of the camp guards were themselves ex-convicts.
During the unusually harsh winter of 1946-1947, conditions at Bad Nenndorf rapidly worsened. A number of severe cases of abuse emerged from the camp between January and March 1947. Several prisoners suffered such severe physical harm that they had to be taken to a local civilian hospital.
Two of the prisoners died within twenty-four hours of arriving at the hospital, and another was so badly malnourished that it took him six months to recover. When it was brought to public notice, the situation at Bad Nenndorf caused a public scandal, both in Britain and Germany. Britain, it was claimed, had established 'concentration camps' similar to those of the Nazis.
London's response to the scandal at Bad Nenndorf was comprehensive, by any standard. Following an initial court of enquiry, a full court-martial was instigated.
This led to several prosecutions between March and July 1948, concerning the mistreatment of nine German prisoners. The chief medical officer at the camp was charged with professional neglect (for which he was convicted) and manslaughter (for which he was acquitted). The officer in charge of interrogations was likewise prosecuted, but was found not guilty. Another interrogation officer narrowly escaped prosecution due to a legal technicality.
As commanding officer at Bad Nenndorf, Stephens was also charged on four counts of professional negligence and disgraceful conduct, although the latter charge was dropped on the first day of his court-martial due to lack of evidence. Much of his case was conducted behind closed doors because of the sensitivity of the testimony heard in his defence, which included details of the information gained on the Soviet Union. Some of the most distinguished officers in the British intelligence community testified in Stephens' defence, including Sir Dick White, a future head of both MI5 and MI6.
Stephens pointed out to the court-martial that, more than anyone else in the British intelligence community, he had persistently stood against the use of 'physical pressure' during interrogations. Stephens alone had unsuccessfully petitioned for more rations at Bad Nenndorf. But at the same time, Stephens warned the court that it should not fool itself: Bad Nenndorf was a brutally tough place, for brutally tough people. Its prisoners included Nazis who had been involved with implementing the Holocaust. Every kind of 'mental pressure' short of physical violence, which Stephens had explicitly prohibited, was used to 'break' prisoners during interrogations.
When Stephens arrived at Bad Nenndorf, he distributed his history of Camp 020 to interrogators to brief them on his rules of non-violence. Stephens' objections to 'third degree' measures were not motivated by humanitarian concerns; indeed, fourteen spies had been tried and executed at Camp 020, and he later admitted that he wished more had been. Rather, Stephens objected to violence because, in his judgment, it produced poor intelligence.
Stephens' rule regarding interrogations was straightforward: he believed that in a protracted ideological battle like the Second World War or Cold War, the quick benefits that might be gained from physical abuse were outweighed by the long-term damage to intelligence-gathering which those acts caused. Stephens believed that the objective of interrogations was not to obtain quick answers to a few questions, nor to extract a simple answer. Rather, interrogations should induce a prisoner to give all the relevant information in his or her possession - and the only way to do that, Stephens believed, was to abide by an axiomatic rule of non-violence.
The court accepted Stephens' defence and cleared him of all charges. After the scandal at Bad Nenndorf, he became a Security Service liaison officer, serving at several posts abroad.
Aftermath
Following the Bad Nenndorf case, the government took steps to ensure that there would be no recurrence. It instigated oversight mechanisms and established universal standards for its interrogation centres abroad. To quote a brief given to the Prime Minister in March 1948: interrogation centres abroad had a crucial role to perform, but it was equally necessary to safeguard the rights of those who were detained.
Bad Nenndorf illustrated the importance of maintaining high standards for the interrogation of detainees. Serious acts of abuse had clearly occurred at the camp, but the implicated officers were investigated and brought to trial. The abuses were carried out at a low level, by interrogators who ignored Stephens' specific instructions, and were never condoned by higher authorities.
Stephens' instructions for the interrogation of prisoners half a century ago remain highly relevant today. The Security Service still operates under strict rules for interviewing and questioning individuals. All Security Service staff are trained in the requirements of the Human Rights Act before they are deployed to operational posts, and the Service has rigorous procedures for ensuring that the law is followed.
