Counter-Proliferation

Key points

  • Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are significant threat to UK national security.
  • Security Service works with other UK agencies, businesses and academic establishments to identify efforts to acquire WMD technology and expertise.

In close co-operation with other Government departments and agencies, including those overseas, the Security Service investigates and seeks to disrupt attempts by countries of proliferation concern to acquire UK materials, technology or expertise that could be relevant to a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme.

This includes work to prevent the acquisition and export of knowledge (or "Intangible Technology Transfer"). For example, students or academics from countries of concern coming to the UK could study a subject of direct benefit to their country's WMD programme. We are monitoring closely the increased threat from international terrorist groups and their potential to acquire WMD and use them as a terrorist weapon.

We visit UK companies, Business Link, chambers of commerce, professional and trade associations, universities and other academic or research establishments. We alert them to the intentions and activities of countries and individuals of proliferation concern, and offer advice about how these could affect them. We will also seek information about their dealings with such people.

There are a number of ways in which we have been successful in the counter-proliferation field. For example:

  • in 2003/2004 we contributed to the disruption of 30 proven or suspected attempts by countries of concern to acquire WMD-related goods or expertise from the UK;

  • we supplied relevant Government departments with information about the UK activities of organisations and individuals from those countries. We also continued to play an active part in the various inter-departmental groups that co-ordinate the UK's overall counter-proliferation effort;

  • we continued to develop our work with business and academia, extending our reach and effectiveness. Since 1992 we have visited over 2,000 companies and 60 academic institutions. We also developed even closer co-operation with our counterparts overseas and regularly exchanged relevant information with them about proliferation activity.

Anyone worried that they might be dealing with or exporting to an individual or organisation of proliferation concern should contact the DTI's Export Control Organisation (new window). A summary of the Government's export control commitments country by country is available on the Foreign & Commonwealth Office website (new window).