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Terrorist trial convictions (30 April 2007)

Since the 7 July London bombings, a number of rumours and misunderstandings have emerged concerning investigations into the bombers and their links to other extremists, particularly the fertiliser bomb plotters. This page addresses a number of these rumours and provides the facts behind the myths.

RumoursReality
Khan and Tanweer were under surveillance by the Security Service before 7 July but this was called off before the attacks.They appeared as unidentified contacts during surveillance of those central to the fertiliser bomb plot. They were not fully identified until after 7 July.
The Security Service and Police had tapes of the 7/7 bombers discussing bombing attacks and tapes of Khan discussing the planning of terrorist attacks.The Security Service did record conversations involving an individual identified after 7 July as Khan. However, he did not discuss either the planning or execution of terrorist attacks in these conversations. The only discussions of bombing attacks that were recorded involved the people who have just been tried/convicted for their participation in the fertiliser plot.
Khan and Tanweer were closely involved with the fertiliser bomb plot and therefore known terrorists.Neither Khan nor Tanweer were involved with the fertiliser bomb plot. They appeared as petty fraudsters in loose contact with members of the fertiliser plot and the intelligence collected on them gave no indication that they posed a terrorist threat.
Khan's car was bugged by the Police/Security Service so why was he not prevented from carrying out an attack?Khan's car was not 'bugged'. After 7 July, the Police identified material recovered from the bomb site at Edgware Road tube station as belonging to Khan. Because they suspected his involvement, they put a tracking device (not a listening device) in his car. Forensic evidence confirmed later that he had died in the attack.
There were recordings of Omar Khyam (one of the defendants in the fertiliser plot trial) talking to Khan about bomb-making.The Security Service did record conversations involving an individual identified after 7 July as Khan. However there is no recording of Khyam discussing bomb-making with Khan. There does however appear to have been a misinterpretation, by some sections of the media, of a ruling given by the Judge at the beginning of the fertiliser plot trial. These stories misinterpreted the ruling to mean that Khan was present when the fertiliser bomb plotters discussed bomb making. In response, the Judge made a second ruling in June 2006 to make it clear that this reporting was 'based on a false interpretation' of his original ruling.
Khan had visited the US to associate with Islamist extremists and planned attacks on US cities in 2003. The FBI had put him on their 'no fly' list - preventing any aircraft from landing in the US with him on board. He had also been refused a US visa.The Security Service has no record of Khan ever visiting the US, nor is there any information to suggest he was planning attacks on US cities. These claims are likely to be based on misidentification as some of these circumstances are true of a Mohammed Ajmal Khan. The FBI has stated that Khan was not on their 'no fly' list. There is also no record of Khan ever having been refused a US visa. See the FBI's press release, "FBI Responds to Report on London Bomber (new window)", of 22 June 2006.
A detainee, who identified Khan after the 7 July attacks from pictures in the media, was not shown a surveillance photo of Khan taken during the fertiliser bomb plot investigation.The detainee was shown surveillance photographs of Khan but failed to recognise him. The same detainee went on to identify Khan from photographs in media reporting, but only after the 7 July bombings and only as 'Ibrahim'.
Convicted terrorist Mohammed Junaid Babar had tipped off the FBI and New York Police about Khan.Prior to 7 July 2005 here is no record of Babar (who was called as a prosecution witness at the fertiliser plot trial) identifying either to the FBI or NYPD someone called 'Khan' as a threat. Only after 7 July did Babar identify Khan as somebody he knew.
Tanweer was identified by non-UK intelligence agencies as someone accessing radical internet websites.No such report was received by any of the UK intelligence agencies.
The Security Service held back intelligence information when giving evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) hearings into the 7 July bombings.The Security Service did not withhold any evidence from the ISC. The chair of the ISC, Paul Murphy MP, made this clear when he spoke in the debate on the ISC Annual Report (pdf, 445kb - new window) on 11 July 2006. He said: "Some allegations have been made that material was withheld from the Committee during the course of our investigations into the events of July last year and, indeed, that we were misled by the agencies. We have examined each and every one of those claims, whether they were made verbally or in the media, and are satisfied that they are not true." Hansard, 11 July 2006, column 1323 (new window).
A criminal mastermind responsible for orchestrating the attacks left the UK the day before 7 July.This is not the Service's current assessment. It was an initial strand of investigation in the immediate aftermath of the 7 July attacks but it was subsequently discounted.
The Saudi authorities warned the UK agencies about the 7 July attacks.No prior warning of the attacks was received from any source. The Saudis provided information about possible planning for an attack in the UK which was materially different from the attacks that took place in London on 7 July.
A Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre report was issued in May 2005 assessing that there was no danger of an attack in the UK.A JTAC report was issued in May 2005 but it did not state that there was no danger of an attack. The text of the assessment is reproduced in paragraph 82 of the ISC report into the 7 July bombings (pdf, 661kb - new window) . It includes the warning that there was 'a continued high level of threat and that an attack might well be mounted without warning'.
In February 2004, the Security Service recorded Khan's wish to fight and him saying goodbye to his family - a clear indication that he intended a suicide mission.The Security Service did record conversations involving an individual identified after 7 July as Khan. From the context of the recorded conversation it is probable that Khan was talking about going to fight with militia groups in the Pakistan border areas. He was not talking about acts of terrorism in the UK.
Khan travelled to Indonesia and associated with known Jemaah Islamiyah extremists.There is no intelligence to suggest this took place.