75. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (new window) enables the Secretary of State to make a "non-derogating" control order against an individual who he has reasonable grounds for suspecting is involved in terrorism-related activity and where he considers it necessary for the protection of the public. These measures can be applied to any individual, irrespective of nationality, and whatever the nature of the terrorist activity. A control order is a last resort measure, to address the threat from an individual where prosecution is not possible and, in the case of a foreign national, where it is not possible to deport him or her due to our international human rights obligations (in particular, where there is a real risk of torture).
76. Control orders are preventative. They place one or more obligations upon an individual in order to prevent, restrict or disrupt involvement in terrorism-related activity. A range of obligations can be imposed to address the risk posed by the individual concerned, including a curfew, restrictions on the use of communication equipment, restrictions on the people that the individual can associate with, and travel restrictions. The legislation requires that control orders made by the Secretary of State must be compatible with the individual's right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (new window) (ECHR). Although there is a procedure in the legislation for Parliament to agree to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR, so the Secretary of State can apply to a court to make a "derogating" control order, this has currently not been exercised.
77. The 2005 Act contains strong safeguards to protect the rights of the individual, including requirements for judicial oversight and review of control orders. The legislation and its operation have recently been challenged in the courts. The High Court ruled on 12 April 2006 that the legislation is incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair hearing), and ruled again on 28 June 2006 that the obligations imposed in six specific cases amounted to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR. The Government is appealing both judgements in the Court of Appeal. All existing control orders remain in force (including the six cases in the second High Court ruling which remain in force pending the outcome of the appeal), and the Secretary of State will continue to make new control orders where he considers it necessary to do so.
Successful disruptions - control orders
There are currently 15 control orders made by the Secretary of State in operation. Nine of these are in respect of foreign nationals; the other six are in respect of British citizens.
78. Whenever terrorists come into contact with the financial system, they can generate vital clues that can lead to their disruption and apprehension. To maximise the impact of this financial intelligence, and make it harder for terrorists to operate, the UK's money laundering and terrorist finance measures require financial institutions to 'know their customer', keep proper records, and report suspicious activity. Irrespective of any final charges, every terrorist suspect is subject to financial investigation. Enquiries following the attacks of 7 July and attempted attacks of 21 July demonstrated the critical role of terrorist finance investigation in progressing specific enquiries and establishing an enhanced intelligence picture.
(e) Seizing and freezing assets
79. A major challenge for law enforcement is to disrupt terrorists' ability to raise, move and use funds. Experience has shown the costs of carrying out bombing incidents to be relatively low but terrorist networks also need more significant funding to support the rest of their activities, including recruitment, training and welfare payments to the families of those killed. This is often achieved through ordinary criminal activity such as identity fraud, cheque fraud and misuse of charities.
80. Various powers now exist to challenge terrorist fundraising. For example, the UK's terrorist asset freezing powers publicly identify suspected individuals and groups linked to terrorism. These also freeze any existing assets and disable terrorists' ability to raise or move further funds.
81. An effective and collaborative partnership between specialist law enforcement officers, government and the private financial sector in the UK has raised awareness of the vulnerabilities and has helped develop solutions.
Successful disruptions - financial
Since 2001, in relation to terrorist cases there have been:
(This does not include the £78 million that was frozen until 2002 as part of UK action against the Taliban.)
82. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions, countries are required to freeze the assets of individuals who are involved with terrorism and stop them receiving payments directly or indirectly. To ensure that these sanctions do not contravene basic human rights, the Government is required to make payments under licence to meet basic expenses. The Government has announced to Parliament that state benefits paid to individuals sharing the same household with a listed person will only be paid under strict licence conditions, providing safeguards to ensure funds are not diverted to terrorism.
83. The proscription of terrorist organisations also contributes towards making the UK a hostile environment for terrorists and sends a strong message that the UK totally rejects such organisations and any claims to legitimacy. Proscription is a tough power as it has the effect of outlawing previously lawful activity. Once an organisation is proscribed it is a criminal offence to belong to, support, or display support for a proscribed organisation. The Terrorism Act also allows the police to seize all property of a proscribed organisation.
Successful disruptions - proscription
84. As recent events have demonstrated, counter terrorist operations can have an impact on relations between the police and local communities. It is in the interest of everyone - in particular the police and the affected local community - that these operations are conducted in the most appropriate and effective manner, and take due account of community relations issues.
85. It is also important that local communities are provided with as much information as possible in a transparent and open manner. However, this needs to be balanced against maintaining the integrity of an ongoing counter-terrorist operation (including protecting the
source of any intelligence) as well as legal constraints. Considerable effort is made by the police at all levels to engage with local communities in such circumstances: through local partnerships, through regular contact with community representatives informally, and through mechanisms such as the Muslim Safety Forum (see below).
86. Lessons are continually being learned on all these issues in order to improve the way in which counter terrorist operations are conducted.
Muslim Safety Forum
There are monthly Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) meetings, held at New Scotland Yard, to address matters of concern to the Muslim communities in the UK, mainly, although not exclusively, related to terrorism and extremism. This is a national meeting, albeit mainly London-based.
It grew out of existing contacts and work with the Muslim Council of Britain, initiated by the police as far back as 2000, and was eventually formalised as the MSF on 13 September 2001. It is run by the Muslim members and community representatives themselves, with police attendance from the Metropolitan Police and the Association of Chief Police Officers; police forces other than the Metropolitan Police attend by request or invitation.
87. Both intelligence gathering and action to disrupt and apprehend terrorists are often carried out in co-operation with our international partners. To facilitate this, the UK provides training and other assistance to certain foreign governments, in order to help them build up their ability to counter terrorism.
Assisting other countries
Working with and through international institutions