THE THREATS
64. The PURSUE strand of CONTEST is concerned with reducing the terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their operations.
65. By their nature, terrorists operate in secret. Intelligence is therefore vital to defeating terrorism. All disruption operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, intentions, and means of operation. The Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (new window) (SIS), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) - known collectively as the security and intelligence agencies - are therefore critical to the work on PURSUE, as is the work of the police, both special branches and neighbourhood policing alike, for UK-based terrorist networks.
66. Our understanding of the new terrorist networks continues to improve. Since September 2001 there has seen a significant shift of Government resources into the business of gathering and analysing information on the threat and configuring departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it. While we are taking action to build an ever better picture of extremist activity within the UK, our understanding of the threat still remains inevitably imperfect.
Taking a joint approach
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which was created in June 2003, has continued to analyse and assess all intelligence relating to international terrorism. It continues to attract interest from overseas as an example of joined-up working in the intelligence field and this approach is being emulated in a number of other countries.
67. Public safety is the top priority for the Government, the police, and the intelligence agencies. The Government fully support the police and Security Service in the difficult decisions they must make when faced with the current terrorist threat. Operational decisions on whether and how to conduct counter terrorist operations are a matter for the police. There may be situations where the police believe they have no choice but to take action on the basis of the specific intelligence they have received. The difficulties in assessing intelligence about terrorist activity were highlighted in the Government's response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks (PDF 243Kb - new window) on 7 July 2005:
"... many pieces of intelligence are received by the [Security and Intelligence] Agencies on a weekly basis on potential terrorist threats and intentions. Terrorists make great efforts to ensure that intelligence about their intentions is difficult to obtain and analyse. Intelligence is generally fragmentary, of varying reliability and difficult to interpret. Complex and challenging investigative judgements have to be made on the basis of often incomplete data. There is always a difficult balance to strike between investigating those known to be a current threat and working to discover other possible threats."
68. Covert operational counter-terrorist activity in the United Kingdom is conducted by the Security Service in close collaboration with police forces across the country and the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police (new window). The police are responsible for taking executive action, such as arrests, and conducting the investigation against those suspected of involvement in terrorism. The SIS and GCHQ, in collaboration with intelligence and security partners overseas, operate covertly in support of the Security Service to disrupt terrorist threats.
Successful disruptions
The police and the security and intelligence agencies have disrupted many attacks against the UK since November 2000, including four since last July alone.
69. The Government continues to strengthen its co-ordinated, multi-agency, and international approach to the disruption of terrorist activity. Prosecution remains the preferred way of responding to persons involved in terrorist activity, but other options for taking disruptive action include deportation on grounds of national security or unacceptable behaviour, control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (new window), freezing and seizing financial assets, and proscription of organisations.
70. There are limits to what we can say about disruption activity. We cannot be publicly explicit about the detail of many of these operations because of the need to preserve operational security and our capability to conduct similar operations in the future. In addition, where individuals are being prosecuted for terrorist offences, the Government obviously cannot discuss specific cases until the legal processes are complete. Many disruptions of terrorist networks lead to prosecutions for other, non-terrorist offences - sometimes major offences such as crimes of violence, and sometimes lesser offences such as fraud - or to actions for deportation, or to impose control orders. In many cases, these actions must by law remain anonymous, so again they cannot be discussed in any detail, though regular information is provided to Parliament on the scale of such actions. For example, the Home Secretary provides a regular quarterly report to Parliament on the exercise of the control order powers. And there is an independent reviewer (new window) (currently Lord Carlile of Berriew QC) who makes an annual report to Parliament on the operation of the control order powers.
71. Successful prosecution in the courts, based on gathering the necessary evidence and apprehending those involved in planning acts of terrorism before they can carry out their intentions, is of course our preferred way of disrupting terrorist activity.
Terrorism Act 2006
The Terrorism Act 2006 (new window) extended the maximum period for which a suspected terrorist could be detained before being charged with an offence from 14 days to 28 days.
Successful disruptions - prosecution
72. Where prosecution is not possible, we make effective use of a number of security measures designed to make the UK a more hostile environment for terrorists to operate in. The Home Office and the Police lead on these activities in the UK; HM Treasury (new window)leads on asset freezing.
73. Where the person concerned is a foreign national, and is a threat to the UK, deportation will usually be an appropriate means of disrupting terrorist activity. This is important in terms of ensuring public safety, as well as sending a strong signal that foreign nationals who threaten our national security cannot expect to be allowed to remain in the UK. Those who are outside the UK will normally be excluded (see Acting on unacceptable behaviours page 12).
Successful disruptions - deportation
74. We have enacted legislation to provide us with additional legal tools to deport and exclude persons who have participated in terrorism.
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
The Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act 2006 (new window) introduced a range of additional measures which are relevant in the counter-terrorism context:
Other mechanisms
It is the Government's policy not to permit individuals from abroad who are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities to remain in the UK. Deporting a terrorist significantly disrupts the activity of that network, which is beneficial internationally, as well as removing that immediate source of potential attacks from the UK. But the Government will not deport someone to a country where he faces a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Therefore we are negotiating agreements with some countries to ensure that, where someone is deported, we can obtain specific assurances, backed up by independent monitoring, to enable us to satisfy ourselves that removal is consistent with our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The UK has concluded Memoranda of Understanding with three countries (Jordan, Libya and Lebanon) to facilitate deportation of terrorist suspects in a manner consistent with our obligations under the ECHR. Monitoring bodies have been appointed in Jordan and Libya; agreement in principle has been reached with a monitoring body in Lebanon. Negotiations are ongoing with a number of other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Separate arrangements are in place for deportations to Algeria.