ABOUT US
Many myths and misunderstandings surround the Security Service and its work. This page counters some of the most popular misconceptions. Answers to common enquiries sent to the Service are provided on the "Frequently Asked Questions" page.
We are a civilian organisation and members of staff have no executive powers, such as the authority to detain or arrest people. We are not a "secret police force".
Our investigations are shared with the police or other law enforcement agencies when there is a prospect of the arrest of people who are committing or planning criminal offences. Over a number of years we have developed and applied procedures that enable our intelligence to be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings (see "Evidence and Disclosure"). In addition, we may recommend to the Home Office or to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office that known terrorists or foreign intelligence officers, for example, be refused entry to the UK or be deported or expelled. However, the decision whether to do so lies outside the Service.
Media reporting sometimes confuses the geographical scope of our work. Threats to national security often come from abroad, for example from foreign intelligence services or from terrorist groups based overseas. Moreover, the scope of national security extends beyond the British Isles and may involve the protection of British interests worldwide, e.g. diplomatic premises and staff, British companies and investments and British citizens living or travelling abroad. Security threats to British interests anywhere in the world fall within the scope of our functions as set out in the Security Service Act 1989.
In dealing with security threats overseas we co-operate closely with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), who are responsible for gathering intelligence overseas, and with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. We also co-operate with foreign police forces and intelligence agencies. (See also: "Partnerships").
It is claimed from time to time that we have been responsible for murdering individuals who have become "inconvenient" in some way. We do not kill people or arrange their assassination. We are subject to the rule of law in just the same way as other public bodies.
Ministers and MPs are not subject to vetting. An incoming Prime Minister will only be told of any information we hold on a potential member of the new Cabinet if that information is both serious in the context of national security and it appears likely that the individual concerned will need access to sensitive information. This has been public knowledge since 1973, when it was referred to in the Report of the Security Commission on the Jellicoe-Lambton affair. In its 1997/98 report the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) referred to the fact that since 1992 the Leader of the Opposition has also been informed of any serious security issue concerning a possible member of the Shadow Cabinet. The numbers involved are very small indeed.
We are sometimes alleged to be responsible for monitoring the private lives of people because they have a high public profile, including members of the Royal Family, Government Ministers and Members of Parliament. This is not the case. We only investigate individuals whose activities fall within our statutory remit under the Security Service Act 1989.
Our role in the vetting of candidates for employment in sensitive government posts is based solely on checks against our records. Decisions on employing staff are the responsibility of the Department concerned and we do not investigate or interview candidates on their behalf.
The Security Service Act 1989 stipulates that we may only disclose information for use in deciding whether someone should be employed in sensitive work if we do so in accordance with arrangements approved by the Home Secretary. If, when we check, we find that we have a significant and relevant security record on an applicant, we may provide a summary assessment of the security information. However, the mere existence of a Security Service record does not necessarily mean that an assessment will be made. There is no "blacklist".
We do not carry out inquiries into leaks of information from Government, except where national security may be affected. As part of our protective security role, we do give advice to Government on security policy and practice and our Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (new window) carries out audits of security arrangements within other Departments on request. But we have no "policing" role.
It has often been alleged that, in the past, we systematically investigated trade unions and various pressure groups, such as the National Union of Mineworkers and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
We have never investigated people simply because they were members or office-holders of trade unions or campaigning organisations. But subversive groups have in the past sought to infiltrate and manipulate such organisations as a way of exerting political influence.
To meet our responsibility for protecting national security, we therefore investigated individual members of bona fide organisations when there were grounds to believe that their actions were "intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means". We investigated the activities of the subversive groups, but not the organisations they sought to penetrate. Any past investigations were carried out within the laws and processes agreed by Parliament at the time.
When the Security Service Bill was debated in Parliament in 1988, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, spelt out the basis for the Service's work in this area:
"It does not matter if... people have views on the structure or organisation of Parliament or if they are involved in seeking to change industrial practices in this country or to negotiate a better deal if they are members of trade unions, or if they seek to challenge or change the Government's policies relating to defence, employment, foreign policy or anything else... Its [the Service's] sole criterion in relation to a subversive threat is whether there is a deliberate intention to undermine parliamentary democracy and whether that presents a real threat to the security of the nation."
The subversive threat to parliamentary democracy in the UK is now negligible and we have no current investigations in this area.
We do not tap telephones or install eavesdropping equipment illegally. In carrying out such operations we comply fully with the provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). Where an eavesdropping operation would also involve entry or interference with a property, a separate warrant is obtained under the Intelligence Services Act 1994. (See also "Gathering intelligence").
We do not have access to other government departments' computer systems. If we have a legitimate requirement for information from other departments, we request that information formally and on an individual basis.
This is not true. We have no interest in non-violent political or religious movements and do not investigate any individuals on the grounds of ethnicity or religious beliefs.
Countering the threat from international terrorists, including those who claim to be acting for Islam, is the Security Service's highest priority. We know that attacks are being considered and planned for the UK by Al Qaida and associated networks. International terrorists in this country threaten us directly through violence and indirectly through supporting violence overseas.
Muslims are often themselves the victims of this violence - the series of terrorist attacks in Casablanca in May 2003 and Riyadh in May and November 2003 illustrate this.
The Service also employs staff of all religions, including Muslims. We are committed to recruiting a diverse range of staff from all backgrounds so that we can benefit from their different perspectives and experience. The site's recruitment pages have further details of employment opportunities for British citizens who speak other languages (this information is also available in Arabic and Urdu).
In his book "Spycatcher", the former Security Service officer Peter Wright claimed that up to 30 members of the Service had plotted to undermine the former Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. This allegation was exhaustively investigated and it was concluded, as stated publicly by Ministers, that no such plot had ever existed. Wright himself finally admitted in an interview with BBC1's "Panorama" programme in 1988 that his account had been unreliable.
It was claimed that Sir Roger Hollis, who was Director General of the Security Service from 1956-1965, was a Russian spy. The Trend inquiry of 1974 cleared Hollis of that accusation. Subsequently, the evidence of the former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky confirmed this judgement.
The Service is an equal opportunities employer and our staff increasingly come from a diverse range of backgrounds and cultures, reflecting the communities in the UK that we serve.
There is almost a 50:50 split of men to women in the Service and 53% of staff are under the age of 40. Currently only 6% of our staff are from an ethnic minority, but we are committed to improving this and progress is being made.
There is also an Equal Opportunities Forum in the Service and a Family Friendly Working Group.
Our recruitment website provides more information about the type of people that we are looking for.
Contrary to media reporting, we do not just recruit people under 5"11. There is a height restriction in place for our mobile surveillance recruitment campaign, but no such restrictions exist for any of the other campaigns. You can be tall and work for the Security Service!
Our members and former members are prohibited by Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989 from disclosing, without lawful authority, information relating to security or intelligence which came into their possession while in the Service.
It is clearly important that security and intelligence information is protected from unauthorised disclosure, to prevent damage being caused to our sources, operations and methods. But Section 1 is sometimes criticised as prohibiting disclosures even about such unimportant matters as the colour of the Thames House carpets (which are blue!) and the menu in the staff restaurant. These criticisms are misguided. Such matters do not fall within the scope of Section 1.
Great care has been taken in the selection of information published on our website. Clearly, we do not publish any material that could jeopardise national security, which we work to protect. All of the information on this website is unclassified and will not provide the terrorist with any information they do not already know.
For the most part, details of our operations must and should remain secret. But stopping terrorists is only one part of our collective defences against terrorism. Another crucial part of our work is to use the unique knowledge we have about the terrorist threat to provide practical and authoritative security advice on how best to protect against it. In the past, our advice was confined mainly to Government, but today's threat of international terrorism makes it important for us to extend this advice to a wider range of people, which we are able to do most effectively via the web.